New Delhi still likes Russian technology, but Washington is trying to
make a sale and enhance American-Indian ties. If a deal happens, it will
further remove India from Russia’s influence. When the Times of India
revealed that the Indian air force was revising its single-engine
fighter competition to encompass twin-engine jet designs, a collective
groan likely rang from New Delhi to Washington—and even Stockholm.
This
first appeared in 2018 and is being reposted due to reader interest.
The competition was meant to acquire a new generation of short-range
jets suitable for defending India’s borders. The Indian air force is
gradually retiring its 1950s-era MiG-21 single-engine fighter jets over
the next few decades. Currently, it has only thirty-three squadrons of
combat aircraft out of a planned forty-four, with ten more squadrons set
to retire their aircraft over the coming decade.
An analyst
quoted by the Times of India characterized India’s Ministry of Defense
as “constantly changing their rules, changing their minds” and having a
“knack for snatching defeat from the jaws of victory.” The exasperation
stems from two factors. The first is that the single-engine competition
had narrowed down to just two choices, the American F-16 and Swedish JAS
39 Gripen. If the government had simply stuck to the original
guidelines, the Indian air force could have begun receiving 115 new
fighters by the early 2020s and retained domestic production facilities
to build even more if desired.
The
second factor is that the Indian government is notorious for its
incredibly slow arms procurement process—that often results in
dysfunctional weapon systems and partially or completely cancelled
orders. Take the preceding Medium Multi-Role Competition (MMCR) which
began in the year 2001: even though the Indian air force wanted to order
more Mirage 2000s, New Delhi insisted on holding a competition that
took so long that the Mirage 2000 stopped being available for
production. Fifteen years later, bickering over technology transfers led
India to order just thirty-six more advanced and expensive Rafale
fighters—out of the 126 aircraft originally stipulated.
Then
there is the domestically built single-engine HAL Tejas (“Radiant”)
Light Combat Aircraft, which India began developing in the 1980s. Over
three decades later, the delta-wing fighter has proven so underpowered
that the Indian navy refused to adopt it into service and the air force
reduced the size of its order. Although HAL is working on an improved
Tejas Mark IA and II which may correct some of the aircraft’s flaws,
production is lagging behind schedule.
So, unless the Ministry of
Defense moves more quickly than before, selection and procurement of
replacement fighters could drag on for years while the fighter force
continues to shrink.
The single-engine requirement was supposedly
revised because the Indian air force never really wanted to constrain
the competition to light fighters in the first place. Instead, the
Indian air force wanted to procure the rest of the medium fighters the
MMCR project failed to obtain. This may have coincided with recent
public furor over the cost-per-plane of the Rafale, causing the Modi
administration to open up the new competition to a wider range of
fighter types.
Single-engine fighters are significantly cheaper
and more cost-efficient to operate than their twin-engine counterparts.
Twin-engine fighters tend to boast greater range and weapons capacity.
As India’s chief likely adversary, Pakistan, is a short hop across the
border, short-range fighters have a viable role to play in India’s
defense strategy. A downside of single-engine jets is that they tend to
suffer higher accident rates because they lack a backup engine.
The
single-engine competition had narrowed down to either the updated F-16
Block 70 or the Saab JAS-39 Gripen-E. While the Swedish jet is more
advanced, the super F-16 would have been cheaper up front and come with
advantageous export conditions due to the U.S. Foreign Military Sales
program. Though both aircraft would have been manufactured in India by
partner companies, the F-16 deal would have involved an opportunity for
India to become the sole distributor of the popular airframe.
Some
critics of the single-engine competition grumbled that investing top
dollars on an upgraded version of a fighter developed in the 1970s was
not a sound investment for the future. However, the Gripen-E and F-16
Block 70 technically both remain on the table, even though the number of
eligible competitors has increased.
Notable new twin-engine
contenders now include the American Super Hornet, the Eurofighter
Typhoon, the French Rafale, and the Russian Su-35 or MiG-35. The Russian
fighters offer good bang-for-buck on paper, but India has been
frustrated by poor after sales support and frequent breakdowns in much
of its Russian hardware—including the MiG-29 and Su-30MKI jets.
Another
factor is the Indian navy, which has to account for fifty-seven naval
fighters operating from its current ski-jump-style aircraft carriers as
well as a planned catapult-equipped flat top carriers. The aircraft
under consideration are the FA-18E Super Hornet, the Rafale-M, a
navalized Gripen, and the MiG-29K—all of which have land-based
counterparts. If both the Indian navy and air force end up choosing
similar aircraft, there could be significant cost-savings in terms of
spare parts and training.
The Super Hornet is favored to win the
naval contract and recent reports indicate it may be the leader in the
revised fighter competition as well. Though the Super Hornet does not
quite match earlier twin-engine fighters such as the F-15 in terms of
raw performance, the newer aircraft are designed with modern digital
avionics, and also has a comparatively stealthy radar cross section of
only one meter squared. The new Block III model comes equipped with
conformal fuel tanks for greater range at lower aerodynamic cost, an
infrared search-and-track system and a sophisticated networkable
targeting computer.
The Stealth Angle
Fourth-generation
jets like the F-16 and Super Hornet are highly capable in most regards,
but aerial war games have suggested one major limitation—they lose by
lopsided margins when pitted against fifth-generation stealth fighters.
Stealth fighters also have much better odds of successfully penetrating
hostile air space defended by ground-based surface-to-air missiles.
New
Delhi has wanted its own stealth fighters for a while—and has invested
the equivalent of over five billion dollars in Russia’s PAK FA stealth
fighter program, now designated as the Su-57, in the hopes of getting an
India-specific variant called the FGFA. However, the program has
suffered major setbacks and Moscow has downsized its production run to
only twelve Su-57s. Indian officials have grown increasingly
disenchanted with the Su-57, publicly complaining about underpowered
engines, subpar stealth characteristics and a lack of transparency as to
what lay behind these problems.
Separately, India’s Defense
Research and Development Organization has invested significant resource
drawing up plans for its own HAL AMCA stealth fighter, with hopes for a
flying prototype in the mid-2020s. However, a viable AMCA would require
India to acquire or develop key technologies including the manufacture
of radar-absorbent materials, high-performance domestic jet engines and
advanced AESA radars.
As it happens, a Hindustan Times article
from March 11, 2018 indicates that the light-fighter competition will
now be linked to the transfer of technologies necessary for producing
the AMCA. This naturally leads to the question: who actually has that
stealth technology to share? India is already linked to Russia’s Su-57
program but is dissatisfied with the collaboration. Both Boeing and
Rafale have some experience with stealth technology, but the clear
leader in the field is Lockheed-Martin, manufacturer of the F-35
Lightning II stealth fighter and the earlier F-22 Raptor.
The
single-engine F-35 has long been the elephant in the room, as it is
being exported to U.S. allies at a price of roughly $100 million per
airframe. Though the Lightning isn’t as fast, maneuverable or
heavy-lifting as top fourth-generation fighters, it’s stealth
characteristics and advanced sensors and avionics allow it to lob
missiles at adversaries from far beyond the range it can be tracked by
opposing X-Band targeting radars. Furthermore, it’s avionics are
designed to share sensor data with less stealthy friendly fighters,
enhancing their effectiveness.
Washington would love for India to
join in on the deal, and not just because India could pitch in more
money to control the bloated per-unit cost of the F-35. The F-35s would
be an expensive, long-term and ongoing commitment that would tie the
Indian military closely to the United States and help counterbalance
China’s modernizing air force. On the other hand, both the U.S. military
and Lockheed are tight-fisted when it comes to sharing both stealth
technology and the F-35’s networked operating system, which could leave
both end users and service providers vulnerable to hacking.
India
had historically relied on the Soviet Union and then Russia to furnish
its military hardware, so spurning the Su-57 program in favor of the
F-35 risks cooling that relationship. Indeed, New Delhi has steadfastly
maintained it is not seeking to purchase F-35s. However, India is
increasingly concerned with with China’s rapidly growing military
capabilities, which include new J-20 stealth fighters and Russian-built
Su-35s. This means New Delhi’s geopolitical interests are drawing it
closer to Washington instead of Moscow, as evidenced by a base-sharing
agreement struck in 2016.
Indeed, on March 4, 2018 the U.S.
Pacific Command’s Adm. Harry Harris revealed that New Delhi was making
inquiries about purchasing F-35s. Realistically, Indian buy-in to the
F-35 would take years to arrange, and the stealth fighter continues to
suffer from serious teething issues in U.S. service. Therefore, even if
the F-35 is on the table, New Delhi will still likely pursue additional
fourth-generation fighters to replenish its shrinking air force.
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