In New Delhi, on December 4, an official from the US Department of
Defence (Pentagon) displayed photographs that convincingly documented China’s
theft of design information relating to America’s most secret defence systems –
fifth generation fighter aircraft and advanced unmanned aerial vehicles.
His
purpose: to explain to the audience of Indian and US military,
defence ministry and industry honchos why New Delhi was being asked to sign an
agreement binding the Indian private sector to safeguard information it
receives relating to American defence equipment.
One such agreement, termed “General
Security of Military Information Agreement” (GSOMIA), was signed on January 17, 2002 between the Indian
and US defence ministers of that time, George Fernandes and Donald Rumsfeld.
GSOMIA of
2002 prescribes security standards and protocols for safeguarding information
shared by the Pentagon with India’s defence ministry; as well as by US defence firms
with Indian defence public sector undertakings (DPSUs).
However, GSOMIA does not cover the exchange of classified
information with Indian private companies. Washington wants this covered, given
New Delhi’s emphasis on the “strategic partnership” (SP) model of procurement,
in which Indian private firms will manufacture defence equipment for the
military, using technology transferred by global “original equipment
manufacturers” (OEMs).
Washington
is not demanding a fresh agreement. It is asking New Delhi to sign an annexure
to GSOMIA that would cover the Indian private sector.
This,
however, remains stuck in the Indian defence ministry’s decision pipeline. “It
seems everything in New Delhi must be cleared at the level of defence minister,
even prime minister”, complains a former Pentagon official, speaking
anonymously.
“US
companies are keen to partner Indian private companies designated as SPs, but sharing
technical information, which is essential for a technical manufacturing
partnership, requires India to extend the GSOMIA to the private sector”, says
Ben Schwartz of the US-India Business Council.
Schwartz
explains how this works in practice. If New Delhi chooses two private Indian firms
to competitively build, say a tank; and they want to partner a US company, the American
firm currently cannot share any classified information with them. It could
share information with DPSUs like Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd or Bharat
Electronics, but not with L&T, or the Tatas.
GSOMIA is
not a public document. It is one of four agreements – initially termed
“foundational agreements” by Washington, but recently toned down to “enabling
agreements” – required by US legislation for facilitating deeper defence
cooperation.. A second agreement, the Logistic Exchange Memorandum of Agreement
(LEMOA) that facilitates mutual logistical inter-dependence, was signed in
2016.
Two others
are currently being negotiated. The Communications Compatibility and Security
Agreement (COMCASA), which safeguards secure communications equipment, is at a
more advanced stage. There is less progress on the Basic
Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geospatial Information and Services Cooperation
(BECA), which lays down protocols for digital mapping and survey.
Washington values the formidable
operational advantage its military gains from its advanced weapons technology
and has enacted strong legislation to safeguard that. India, in contrast, has
not traditionally safeguarded military technology.
In the
American security establishment, personnel and entities are accorded security
classification – like confidential, secret or top secret – which governs the
level of classified information they are cleared to handle. This is strictly
observed. When somebody cleared to handle “secret” information communicates
with another person or entity that is cleared only to handle “confidential”
information (one level lower), he or she must weigh each word to maintain the
exchange at the “confidential” level and to ensure no “secret” information is
inadvertently passed on.
US defence industry has similar security
clearances. For example, an F-16 plant has some
sections with a security classification of “confidential”, and others
classified “secret”. Access to each section is governed by a visitor’s security
classification.
New Delhi officials complain this is just an “American problem”, and that Russia never raises such demands. US officials counter that Russia ignores technology security because it simply does not have the highest-end technology.
Ajai Shukla
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