(Defpro.com ) : Anyone even remotely familiar with the vagaries and complexities of Indian defence procurement will be only too aware of the risks involved with commenting on the results of a major competition there before the relevant contract has been signed and has entered into force (as well as, on a number of occasions, even after that). But even with a prudent attitude, it is nowadays clear that the Dassault Rafale and the Eurofighter Typhoon have been shortlisted as the two final contenders in the Indian Air Force’s multi-billion-dollar MMRCA competition for the procurement (mostly through licence construction) of 126 latest-generation multi-role fighter aircraft.
Such a choice in principle obvious entails truly monumental strategic and political implications for the future of India as a whole, the more so in that it implies rejecting the Russian (MiG-35) and most particular the American offers (F-16, F/A-18). These implications will most certainly provide food for thought to commentators and analysts for many months to come. This column is however focused on a not-so-collateral aspect, namely on what the Indian choice tells us about the respective characteristics and performance of the some of the world’s leading fighter designs, competing against each other on the global defence market.
The Indian Air Force has carried out an extremely stringent and detailed competitive evaluation process, extensively testing the six competitors (Rafale, Typhoon, Gripen, MiG-35, F-16, F/A-18) and assessing them against each other on a list, that included some 650 parameters. It is highly dubious whether any other air force in the world ever had the chance to perform a similar process, thus gaining a detailed, first-hand knowledge of the respective strong points and shortcomings of the best combat aircraft money can buy. And at the end of this technological evaluation process, two European designs have emerged as the best of the best.
The key point to be underlined here is that the Rafale and the Typhoon have been downselected ’on technical and operational grounds alone’, that is, even before discussions and negotiations on price, technology transfer and offset are to start. This on the one hand implies that it is perfectly feasible for such discussions and negotiations to eventually fail, leading to the competition being reopened (hence, the need for a prudent attitude). But on the other hand, the conclusion is inescapable: the latest and most capable European fighter aircraft are vastly superior – in terms of design and overall performance _ to everything the US industry can currently offer. They are so superior, in fact, that after having tested them a discerning customer would not even bother to ask for the price of the American competitors. And this is so, despite both the F-16 and F/A-18 boasting the significant advantage of an arguably more advanced and most certainly way more mature combat system, including at its top a second-generation fully operational AESA radar as against European prototypes.
This situation, with the likes of the Rafale and Typhoon having no real export-cleared US counterpart, has nothing to do with the capabilities and technological level of the respective aerospace industries. Rather, it is linked to the choice of the timing for the launch of the development programmes for new-generation combat aircraft on the two sides of the Atlantic, as well with the US decision to go for an uncompromising stealth approach which, just because brilliantly successful must remain the exclusive equipment of the US Air Force.
The perception of such a significant “commercial capability gap”, whereby the US will progressively become less and less able to beat off the European (and Russian) competition on the global market for combat aircraft until the F-35 becomes fully operational and credible, is not a new development. Indeed it surfaced a dozen years ago if not even earlier, and it has been the main rationale for the unprecedented decision to launch the JSF programme as a “multi-national project” – the undeclared but only too evident goals being to drain European financial resources, that would otherwise be invested in the further development of European designs, as well as lure at least some countries into taking a blind commitment towards eventually acquiring an aircraft, of unknown performance and at an unspecified price.
But not everybody has fallen into the JSF trap, and there still are countries left that would rather select their new combat aircraft after taking a very close look at their performance first, before moving to discuss the price. The (preliminary) results of the Indian MMRCA competition tell the world that if you want the best, and your pockets are deep enough, with the F-22 out of the fray and the F-35 still years away, you will want to go for either the Rafale or the Typhoon. The competitors are, to put it mildly, a second-best choice.
It would be very interesting to watch whether this message will reverberate on other procurement decisions ahead – at least in countries, that can afford to say “no, thanks” to Washington.
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Dr. Ezio Bonsignore,
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