Instead of pouring money into raising a force that can hardly address the Indian Army’s drawbacks at the border, our decision makers should have focussed on addressing China’s weaknesses in the Indian Ocean
In the history of Indian strategic thought, the decision to create a
mountain strike corps against China will remain a landmark. While the
file on the subject has apparently been circulating for a while, the
absence of open discussion on so momentous a decision is deeply
disappointing. Some commentators are of the view that the Chinese
incursion in the Depsang plains swung the decision decisively in favour
of the strike corps. If so, it doesn’t make much sense, for, where is
Depsang and where is Panagarh — the headquarters of the mountain strike
corps?
What irks a strategic commentator about this decision is the question
whether our reaction is wiser, more mature and better institutionalised
than it was in 1962. At that time, the Prime Minister had “instructed”
the army to “throw out” the Chinese following which Brigadier Dalvi’s
mountain brigade made its fateful advance across Namka Chu. The big
question today is — what were our options? Did we examine more than one
option and select the best one? Presumably, it is to guarantee that we
go through an intellectual process that we now have a Chiefs of Staff
Committee, an Integrated Staff, a National Security Council and Adviser,
and the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS). Did they actually look at
alternatives, or was it a straightforward case of ‘yes’ or ‘no’ for a
mountain strike corps?
The first step
The first thought that strikes a strategic thinker is whether any
non-military options were first examined. This is an inevitable first
step in the long and tortuous process that leads up to military action.
The Depsang incident, it will be remembered, took place in a part of the
country which, before 1954, was always shown as un-demarcated or
undefined. What, for instance, were the arguments in the CCS for and
against the Johnson-Ardagh Line and the Macartney line? Those who are
unfamiliar with these names can take a look at Wikipedia. It is the
essence to understanding a possible settlement of the boundary dispute.
The fact is that while our case in Arunachal Pradesh is strong and
undisputed, the situation is not quite similar in the west where the
recent intrusion took place. Admittedly, the political numbers simply
don’t permit the government to commit itself to a grand bargain with
China on territory. The Chinese are in a similar position. But if the
border problem hinges for a solution on a strong, domestic government,
it is indeed better for both countries to postpone the solution to the
next generation — as the Chinese suggest. So how did we come to the
conclusion that the Chinese may force the border issue now, leading us to raise a mountain strike corps?
It has been argued that China is a continental power with a huge land
army. It is making amends by funding its Navy strongly, to change the
balance. But its army reforms have converted its land forces into a
large armoured and air mobile force capable of rapid redeployment.
Under these conditions, to raise an infantry heavy mountain strike corps
has obvious disadvantages. First, it would be geographically confined
to one or two axes of movement and capable of being blunted. Secondly,
whatever we may do on land, we will remain an asymmetric power vis-à-vis
the huge People’s Liberation Army (PLA), whose defence budget is thrice
ours. Thirdly, a strike corps in the mountains denies us the time and
place of a counter offensive, because it is geographically limited.
These arguments should have come up during the process of examining
options. If they didn’t, it is tragic and shows little improvement from
the confusion and bluster of 1962 preceding the disaster.
Infantry heavy
The Indian Army is a fine institution and no one grudges it any funding.
But it is also one of the most infantry heavy armies in the world. Its
armour-to-infantry ratio is badly skewed, it is not air mobile, its
manoeuvre capability is poor and Rs.60,000 crore would have addressed
all these deficiencies and more. Instead, with the strike corps it will
become even more infantry heavy and Rs.60,000 crore will have been
wasted in barely addressing the tremendous disparity with the PLA’s
mobility, numbers and manoeuvre capability. It must be remembered that
we are addressing mountain warfare, where high altitude acclimatisation
is a necessity for soldiers before being deployed. So the mountain
strike corps would already be at high altitudes with little possibility
of being redeployed without huge air mobility. All this should have been
apparent to the Army Aviation Corps whose leaders seem bereft of
strategic thinking, having flown light helicopters all their lives.
Stopping the advancing Chinese in the mountains strung out through the
valleys should have required specialised ground support aircraft like
the A-10 Warthog, another strategic choice which was probably ignored by
the army aviation branch. By not examining non-army options we seem to
be repeating the mistakes of 1962 when the Sino-Indian war became a
purely army-to-army affair for reasons that have still not been
established.
Strengths & weaknesses
We are not privy to the notings in the file preceding the decision to
raise a mountain strike corps, but it would certainly appear that the
border issue appears to have been treated purely as an army problem for
which only the army can find a solution, with the other arms of the
government contributing nothing. Most of all, we appear not to have
assessed the Chinese weakness and strengths. Their strength is the huge
logistic network that they have built up in Tibet. By creating a one
axis strike corps, we have played into their strengths. The Chinese
weakness lies in the Indian Ocean, a fact that even Beijing will readily
concede. The clash between their political system and economic
prosperity requires resources and, increasingly, the Chinese resource
pool is Africa, which generates massive sea lines of communication
(SLOC) through the Indian Ocean. Today, they are merely SLOCs; tomorrow
they will be the Chinese Jugular. Beijing’s paranoia about the Indian
Ocean is therefore understandable but the threat according to its
strategic commentators comes only from the U.S. Sixty thousand crore
spent on strengthening the Indian Navy’s SLOC interdiction capability
would have given us a stranglehold on the Chinese routes through the
Indian Ocean. The Himalayan border, the entire border, could have been
held hostage by our strength in the Indian Ocean with an investment of
Rs.60,000 crore.
No one minimises the pinpricks that the Chinese are capable of but what
we are looking for is an asymmetric capability to balance the Chinese
four-fold advantage in GDP over India. Finding the solution requires all
arms of the government to debate where our scarce resources should go. A
geographically limited one axis offensive will not destabilise the PLA,
but a flotilla of nuclear submarines and a three carrier air group in
the Indian Ocean can economically cripple mainland China.
(Raja Menon retired as Rear Admiral / The Hindu)
No comments:
Post a Comment
Note: Only a member of this blog may post a comment.