Last week, India’s Chief of Defense Staff General Bipin Rawat said in an
interview to an Indian newspaper that the Indian military is not an
expeditionary force and should not be deploying forces around the globe.
He said that Indian forces have “to guard and fight only along our
borders, and, of course, dominate the Indian Ocean Region.”
He
went on to add that the military services should not seek large imports
“by misrepresenting our operational requirements.” He targeted the
Indian Navy’s carrier plans, saying that because carriers, as surface
vessels, can be “knocked off by missiles,” the Navy should invest more
in submarines.
Rawat’s statements have several implications.
Most importantly, it calls into question the Indian Navy’s and the Air
Force’s acquisition plans. These are particularly important at a time
when China has been both putting pressure on the Sino-Indian border and
venturing into the Indian Ocean Region. Rawat’s comments could also
bring back concern within the Navy and the Air Force about the Army’s
dominance within the Indian military and potentially lead to intensified
interservice rivalry among the three services. The creation of the
chief of defense staff (CDS) post was meant at least partly to create
greater synergy among the services and greater jointness, but that could
be at risk if the two smaller services feel the CDS is being partial to
the Army.
Clearly, the economic impact and the financial implications of the
COVID-19 pandemic is going to be significant. The Indian defense budget
allocation over the last two years has been the lowest since the early
1960s, but the COVID-19 impact is likely to lead to further slashing the
defense budget. This in turn will affect major defense procurements,
particularly for the Navy and Air Force. Both are services that require
capital-intensive investment in acquisitions that take longer term
planning and a lot of lead time. They are not going to be happy about
the CDS’s comments.
This issue has clearly been on Rawat’s mind
for some time, and possibly has been under debate within the government
too; the CDS was repeating earlier comments. In February this year,
Rawat said that the Indian Navy’s request for a third aircraft carrier
may not be approved any time soon because the priority is to strengthen
the submarine fleet.
The CDS cited cost as the major factor for
this pushback. Rawat of course has to prioritize the military’s
acquisition, depending on the available funds, but cutting down on
aircraft carriers is likely not going to be easy. The Indian Navy is
already pushing back.
Sources in the Indian Navy are reported to
have said that the service is certain about its plans for a third
aircraft carrier. They added that “the third aircraft carrier is an
operational necessity. It is not that an aircraft carrier can be bought
off the shelf. Even if all permissions are given today, it will take 15
years for the carrier to be inducted.” Admiral Karambir Singh, chief of
the Indian Navy, previously stated that he was convinced that “the
country needs three aircraft carriers, so that two are operational at
all times.
And it should be 65,000 tonnes with electromagnetic
propulsion,” probably a misquoted reference to the Electromagnetic
Aircraft Launch System (EMALS) with which the Navy plans to equip future
aircraft carriers. Navy sources have also argued that shore-based
aircraft operations, as indicated by the CDS, will be limited in terms
of range.
India currently has one operational aircraft carrier, the INS
Vikramaditya, which can host around 30 aircraft. The second, INS
Vikrant, is still being built at the Cochin shipyard in south India, and
is expected to be operational only by 2022, though even that is likely
an optimistic timeline.
But Rawat’s emphasis on dominance in the
Indian Ocean Region also cannot be addressed adequately if he plans to
shrink the naval budget. Both Prime Minister Narendra Modi and External
Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar have emphasized an ambitious agenda for
the Indian Ocean Region. To play an effective role in this vast maritime
space, India would need a much higher number of ships. A falling naval
budget would not permit this.
India’s declining submarine fleet
has been an additional matter of concern. With only 13 operational
submarines, many of which are old, India cannot match the more capable
navies in the Indo-Pacific, such as those of China and Japan. Unless
India adds to its submarine fleet quickly, it may move down to the level
of Pakistan, which has just eight operational submarines.
But
the budget woes are unlikely to ease. The CDS and the Army leadership
are also likely come under pressure to seriously think about downsizing
the Army. With a strength of around 1.4 million personnel, the Indian
Army is the world’s largest land force, followed by North Korea and
China. China, in its attempt at modernizing its military, reduced the
size of its Army by half and is now increasing its emphasis on the
People’s Liberation Army Navy and Air Force.
Pensions and
salaries are becoming the biggest burden on the military budget and
crowding out capital investments and much of this is the result of
India’s massive army. The CDS is right in arguing for budget
prioritization, but this might lead to calls for pruning the Army.
The Diplomat