New Delhi. The Indian Army is finally set to get its first
lot of combat helicopters, and the beginning is being made with the
Boeing Apache AH-64E.
The Army Aviation Corps has been sanctioned 11 of these latest combat
helicopters. These machines in fact are from the 50 per cent option
clause in the Boeing contract for 22 helicopters for the Indian Air
Force (IAF). As the validity of the offer at the same old IAF price and
terms and conditions is only till September, the Army, Ministry of
Defence and Boeing are working full time to ensure that the order is
placed well on time, sources told
India Strategic.
Notably, the Army had demanded 39 Apache attack helicopters for its
three Strike Corps in the plains. Initially, the Government approved 22
machines for the IAF, but later, as a policy decision, it was decided to
give further supplies to the Army. The Defence Acquisition Council
(DAC) chaired by Defence Minister Arun Jaitley gave the approval for
acquisition of these 11 helicopters on May 20 this year.
It is not known if and when the Army will get the 28 more Apaches it
desires, but the previous Government had accorded it this approval in
principle in 2012. Due to budget constraints, IAF has been made
reluctantly to give up its hope on its follow-on requirement. There will
have to be fresh negotiations for any new lot.
Nonetheless, the Army and IAF will not only both operate the
formidable Apaches, they will also get the indigenous Light Combat
Helicopters (LCH) being developed by HAL in numbers. IAF has already
ordered 64 of these machines, made mostly from composite materials to
facilitate their flights up to 5,000 meters, that is, mountainous
terrains like the Kargil heights. As no country makes helicopters
specifically for such heights and the rough corrosive Himalayan weather,
HAL has been trying to do the needful and several development flights
of the LCH have already taken place.
As for the Apaches for the Army and IAF, they will have commonality
in capabilities and onboard weapons and warfare suites, including the
Lockheed Martin’s Longbow radar and Raytheon’s air-to-air Stinger
missiles. The 64E variant is the latest and also being given to the US
Army nearly at the same time.
The Longbow is a powerful radar and helps detect targets hidden in foliage and dense environment.
Background
The case for inclusion of Combat, or Attack, Helicopters to be part
and parcel of the Army dates back to 1963 when Gen JN Chaudhary, the
then Chief of Army Staff (COAS), stressed the requirement for a separate
air wing for the Army.
He had emphasised that efforts at increasing the firepower and
mobility of the Army would not be complete without an integral aviation
element comprising light, medium, heavy as well as armed/attack
helicopters. Finally, after vacillating for decades, it was on October
12, 2012 that the Government took the call on the crucial issue of the
ownership and operations of Attack Helicopters in favour of the Army.
Although the first 22 Apaches are to stay with IAF, the new
acquisitions will be owned, operated and maintained by the Army. Though
late in coming, the decision was a welcome step for the Army and would
have a major impact on war fighting in the Tactical Battle Area
(TBA).This lethal weapon system as part of Army’s inventory is expected
to greatly enhance its capability, making it a battle winning factor in
any future conflict.
The Army had also demanded that the 22 Apaches for the IAF should
also be transferred to it but IAF has held that it has to have them as
part of its control over the Indian skies and also to complement its
various aerial assets, particularly for Combat Search and rescue (CSAR).
The Ministry of Defence agreed with this view.
The Army has a few aviation pilots posted to existing IAF combat
helicopter squadrons – or units as the Army calls them – which operate
the Russian Mi-25 and Mi-35 machines. These helicopters are owned and
operationally controlled by the Army but flown by IAF. Because of this
factor, the Army also suggested 50:50 share of the Apaches but this was
not accepted. Instead the Government accorded approval for a fresh lot
of 39 Apaches for the Army.
It is with this background that the current approval for the Army to
acquire Apache helicopters needs to be viewed. As this is a repeat order
under the options clause, there will be no fresh tendering or trials
but a smooth continuation of the supplies on the same terms.
India had purchased 22 Apaches and 15 CH-47 Chinooks for about $3
billion under the US Government’s Foreign Military Sales (FMS)
programme.
Why Attack Helicopters for the Army
The primary mission of army aviation is to fight the land battle and
support ground operations, operating in the TBA as a combined arms team
expanding the ground commander’s battlefield in space and time.
Its battlefield leverage is achieved through a combination of
reconnaissance, mobility and intense fire power. The combat helicopter’s
greatest contribution to battlefield success is the ability it gives a
Commander to apply decisive combat power at critical times virtually
anywhere on the battlefield in the form of direct fire from aviation
manoeuvre units (attack/armed helicopters) or insertion of overwhelming
ground forces at the point of decision (utility/lift helicopters).
The assets required for the above manoeuvre, that is, the attack and
assault helicopters must be at the beck and call of the field force
commander and also piloted by men in olive green who fully understand
the ground situation. This will ensure the optimum utilisation of the
battle winning resource. This has been the basic rationale on which the
army’s case for ownership of these assets rests.
Significantly, unlike the Air Force assets, the Army Aviation units
and helicopters are located closer to their operational areas and along
with the formations affiliated to, especially at the Corps level. During
war, these units will require to operate from forward composite
aviation bases, catering for security, maintenance, fueling and arming
facilities. The employment philosophy dictates the need to develop
organisations that enhance aviation capabilities to support the concept
of operations of field commanders and be tailored to meet the evolving
operational requirements; hence the concept of Aviation Brigade with
each Corps and not bases as in the case of Air Force.
With the Indian Army’s Doctrine of ‘Cold Start’ or the ‘proactive
strategy’ as the Government would like to call it, which is Pak-centric,
restructuring has been done of the Pivot Corps to enable quick and
immediate action within 48-72 hours by using the integral assets at the
Corps level. This also calls for induction of combat and other
helicopters within the Army itself.
In fact both our adversaries, China and Pakistan, have very potent AH
inventories in the air arms of their respective armies. The Pakistani
army has the Russian Mi-25/Mi-35 and US Huey Cobras attack helicopters
while reports indicate that it has also acquired the Chinese Z-10
recently.
Indian Army’s Helicopter Inventory
The Army is already in the process of inducting the armed version of
the Advanced Light Helicopter (ALH) Rudra developed by the HAL with a
unit currently under raising. Though not a typical attack helicopter, it
has an array of comparable weapon systems to include gun, rockets,
air-to-air and air-to-ground missiles (ATGM). The Rudra units are to
form part of the Holding/Pivot Corps constituting a formidable offensive
punch to the field force commander.
On the other hand, the LCH developed by HAL is expected to be a
milestone achievement. The LCH aims to gatecrash the exclusive club of
the state-of-the-art light attack helicopters, which includes
Eurocopter’s Tiger, Bell’s AH-1Z Super Cobra and China’s Zhisheng 10
(Z-10).
The LCH is a derivative of the ALH and the Rudra and is being
designed to fit into an anti-infantry and anti-armour role with
capability to operate at high altitudes (16,000 feet), a distinct
advantage over other attack helicopters.
Its induction is just about on the anvil. The Government has cleared
induction of five LCHs in the Army although their number eventually
would be much more.
It may be recalled that during the 1999 Kargil War, neither the
Indian Air Force nor the Army had required helicopter assets to support
the Indian troops fighting to evict the intruding Pakistanis from the
rough mountain heights where the battles were concentrated.
Conclusion
The primary role of the Attack Helicopters the world over is to
support and fight the land battle in the tactical domain. It has to
operate as part of the combined arms team and not in isolation. This has
been the experience in the Gulf War as also in Afghanistan.
The visibility of an attack helicopter, which is literally a flying
tank, can boost the morale of own troops and its firepower would be
lethal for an enemy.
With the increasing induction of a range of helicopters, the Indian
Army will need to plan and work out appropriate employment philosophies
as well as rugged training and maintenance procedures to exploit the
full potential of these battle winning machines in the future.
indiastrategic
