The Indian Air Force reportedly is set to formally reboot its plans to
purchase nearly 115 fighter jets within weeks, but it may tie any final
contract to a demand that it also receive technical assistance for its
domestic fifth generation fighter project. This decision would seem to
confirm ongoing reports that India is not happy with the progress of its
existing stealth fighter deal with Russia, might again give Lockheed
Martin an upper hand since it is already building the F-35 Joint Strike
Fighter, and could just further complicate the already protracted
attempts to get any new aircraft.
On March 11, 2018, The
Hindustan Times reported that India would begin sending out official
requests for information to companies looking to submit bids on the
fighter jet tender by the first week of April. In February 2018, it
emerged that the India Air Force would halt an existing plan to buy 114
single-engine fighter jets and rewrite the requirements to open the deal
up to twin-engine designs, as well. The revised deal will now include
the winning firm to transfer potentially sensitive technology to support
the Indian military’s fifth generation fighter program, known as the
Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA).
“We have asked the
Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) to prepare a list
of technologies they need help with for the AMCA,” the unnamed
individual told The Hindustan Times. “There will be clear clause on the
transfer of those technologies in the contract.”
India’s efforts
to procure new fighter jets have already been a saga spanning more than
decade. This new tender will be the third formal attempt to purchase the
aircraft since 2007. Hindustan Aeronautics Limited has been officially
working on the AMCA project since 2010, with a goal of having a flying
prototype by 2025.
With immediate contract field now open to both
single- and twin-engine designs, the competition will most likely
including American manufacturers Boeing and Lockheed Martin with their
F/A-18E/F Super Hornet and F-16IN Viper respectively, the French
Dassault Rafale, the Eurofighter Typhoon, Sweden’s Saab Gripen-E, and at
least one Russian aircraft, such as a variant of the MiG-35 Fulcrum-F
or Su-35 Flanker-E. The F-16IN appeared to have the lead over the
Gripen-E in the previous-single engine tender.
As we had noted in
the past, there were a number of good reasons why a twin-engine design
might turn out to be the new favorite. Most importantly, the Indian Air
Force is already buying 36 Rafales. French authorities have been pushing
India to begin negotiating a new deal for a second tranche of 36 more
jets, but so far India has not made any official announcement about any
additional purchases.
The French jet and the F/A-18E/F are also
emerging as the front-runners in an Indian Navy competition to purchase
new fighter jets for its presently planned fleet of short-takeoff but
arrested recovery (STOBAR) aircraft carriers, as well as the catapult
assisted takeoff but arrested recovery (CATOBAR) types it wants to build
in the future. If both services were to operate the same aircraft, or
variants with a high commonality in basic components and mission
systems, this could cut logistics and sustainment expenses and offset
the typically higher costs of twin-engine aircraft compared to
single-engine types.
As such, it looked initially that Boeing and
Dassault had the most to gain from the changes to the Indian tender.
But the inclusion of the stealth fighter technology transfer requirement
could change the calculus yet again.
If nothing else, this could
be a signal that India will be less inclined to consider any offering
from Russia. The Indians and the Russians have been working together on
fifth generation fighter jet development for some time, there have been
repeated reports that the Indian Air Force is frustrated with the lack
of results from the Su-57 stealth fighter project and more recently
there has been the suggestion that authorities in New Delhi might
finally scrap that work altogether. It was possible that the Kremlin’s
otherwise curious decision to send a pair of its prototype jets to Syria
in February 2018 was in part to try and demonstrate more significant
progress with that program.
Of the remaining likely contenders,
only some are actively working on low-observable aircraft. Not all of
them are doing so at the same level or are developing a fifth generation
fighter specifically.
Boeing has been working on some limited
low-observable upgrade options for the Super Hornet, as well the latest
models of its F-15 Eagle, such as fully-enclosed weapons pods or
conformal add-on bays. This level of technological knowhow may not be
enough to satisfy the DRDO’s desire for broader help with the ACMA.
While
Dassault has been working on stealthy unmanned combat air vehicles
(UCAV), European aviation consortium Airbus – which supports production
of the Typhoon in various countries – has been the firm more actively
working on France’s future fifth generation fighter project. Regardless,
French stealth fighter and UCAV programs are also in partnership with
Germany and the United Kingdom, respectively, which could add another
hurdle in sharing any appropriate technical information with the
Indians.
Saab has been quietly working on the Swedish Air Force’s
Flygsystem 2020 stealth fighter project for at least a decade now, but
the exact status of that development is unclear. In 2013, the company
did sign a deal to support Turkey’s fifth generation TFX project.
Lockheed
Martin is the only competitor actively producing a fifth generation
fighter jet, the F-35, which could give it a leg up again in the
competition. The Maryland-headquartered company had already made a
particularly appealing pitch in the last iteration of the competition,
stating that if its F-16IN won, it would establish a joint production
line with Indian manufacturing conglomerate Tata to build jets for the
Indian Air Force and use that same domestic assembly line to churn out
additional aircraft for export elsewhere. On top of that, it said it
would consider working with Tata to build Viper components even if the
contract fell through.
It is conceivable that the firm might now propose a new deal wherein
India buys conventional F-35As for the Indian Air Force and gets
additional help with the ACMA. Lockheed Martin might then also offer the
short and vertical takeoff capable F-35B or carrier-focused C models as
options for the Indian Navy's tender.
The U.S. government will
have to approve any deal involving an American company and this might be
a more complicated procedure with regards to the sensitive technology
in the F-35. American authorities will have to gauge whether or not they
believe it is in the country's best interests to give India access to
and details about low-observable design features and manufacturing
processes, as well as advanced avionics, radars, sensor systems, data
links, computer networks, and other mission systems.
However,
President Donald Trump and his administration have shown much greater
willingness to explore selling Joint Strike Fighters more broadly,
including to the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, already. The
administration has also looked to bolster its ties with India in
general, making the country a centerpiece of its new Afghanistan and
South Asian policy goals. It's not hard to imagine Lockheed Martin
getting approval for a deal to sell dozens of F-35A, B, and C models to
the Indian government, which could potentially help in further driving
down the plane's unit costs, which is a major goal for the U.S.
military.
But India may not be as interested in buying any
foreign stealth fighter as it is in getting assistance for the domestic
ACMA. In February 2018, there were reports that Indian authorities had
requested a classified briefing on the Joint Strike Fighter, but the
next month Indian Air Force Chief Air Chief Marshal B.S. Dhanoa publicly
denied those claims.
This episode followed a Press Trust of
India report in January 2018 that suggested Lockheed Martin was
considering establishing a production line for the F-35 in India. The
company subsequently said that report has misstated remarks from one of
its executives and added that there were no plans to build even a less
expansive final assembly and checkout facility, or FACO, in the country.
At present there are FACOs in Italy and Japan supporting the
international Joint Strike Fighter program.
And even if India
were to receive U.S. government approval to purchase the F-35 and pursue
that option, it’s not clear what kind of technological information
Lockheed Martin might truly be willing to transfer in the end and to
what degree. Most importantly, as it stands now, with the exception of
Israel, all the countries taking part in the Joint Strike Fighter
project have found themselves linked in large part to a multi-national
logistics and information chain thanks to the jet’s on board computer
brain, called the Autonomic Logistics Information System (ALIS).
This
has already prompted concerns in a number of countries about how much
sensitive data the jets are collecting and potentially sending to
Lockheed Martin or the U.S. government or if they might be shut off from
software updates or other critical data in an emergency. At the same
time, even when working with the U.S. military, Lockheed Martin has been
especially keen to keep control over as much of its proprietary network
architecture as possible.
The U.S. military has similarly shared
concerns about whether or not this level of connectivity puts the
United States’ own capabilities at risk. Foreign computer networks may
be more vulnerable to cyber attacks and espionage or could be
deliberately linked to systems that might feed information on to hostile
nations. Turkey, for instance, wants to connect its future F-35s to the
rest of its integrated air defense net, which will eventually include
Russian-made S-400 surface-to-air missile systems.
Similar
considerations could easily apply to requests for technology transfer
from any other entrant into the revised Indian fighter competition. In
turn, it seems very likely that linking both requirements together could
easily slow down the overall process, even after India picks a winning
design, due to the need for complex negotiations. The Indian purchase of
just 36 Rafale jets for the country’s air force experienced significant
delays due to disputes over technology transfer and local production
and that deal remains clouded in controversy.
All of this comes
as the Indian Air Force is increasingly in desperate need of new fighter
jets, whether they be advanced fourth generation or stealthy fifth
generation designs. Since 2001, the service has made it clear that it
has a standing requirement for more than 100 aircraft to replace a host
of aging types that are increasingly literally falling out of the sky.
India
is also facing increasing challenges from China, which is expanding its
influence in Asia and elsewhere around the world, as well as the need
to provide a credible defense against long-time rival Pakistan.
According to The Hindustan Times, China has approximately 60 squadrons
of combat aircraft, while Pakistan has 25.
The Indian government
has said that, in order to counter those potential threats and perform
other necessary missions, the Indian Air Force needs at least 42
squadrons of combat aircraft itself. At present, it has 31, down from 33
in 2017, and that number is almost certain to continue to drop
dramatically over the next decade unless something changes.
It’s
seems increasingly clear that India cannot afford to wait much longer
to acquire additional aircraft. And whether or not it will be able to
rely on a domestic project, even with foreign assistance, to produce a
stealth fighter design in a timely manner isn’t guaranteed, either.
Fifth
generation fighter jet programs have historically shown themselves to
be exceptionally costly and time consuming, even for manufacturers with
histories of building stealthy aircraft. India’s own effort to develop a
much less complex indigenous fourth generation type, the Tejas, has
been beset by both technical and bureaucratic hurdles. That aircraft, as
it exists now, has largely failed to meet expectations despite more
than two decades of work, with the Indian Navy rejecting the idea of
buying a carrier based version of it outright.
As it stands now,
India is clearly pushing ahead with its desire to use this fighter jet
tender to help expand its on domestic production military aviation
capacity and capabilities. At a certain point, it may have to temper
those goals with the increasingly pressing need for capable combat
aircraft, but its not clear whether that would do anything to get past
the country's otherwise historically dysfunctional or erratic
procurement process.
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