India is all set to firm up a defence logistics agreement with France,
just like the LEMOA with the United States. The move will allow India
access to French military bases in the Indian Ocean and the Horn of
Africa, and round off another critical part of enhancing its military
presence in these waters to counter China.
The agreement, which
is expected to be signed during French President Emmanuel Macron’s visit
to India in early March, was firmed up around the time New Delhi worked
out the fine-print with Seychelles to build and operate a military base
there.
What’s important to understand, however, is the bigger
picture which is evidently falling in place, and why it’s important not
to stop just here.
The approach ::
There are
essentially two major frames to this strategy – bases which India will
build, and bases or ports that its forces can access.
On the
first count, India moved on Assumption Island in Seychelles and Agalega
islands in Mauritius, both on the outer stretches of Africa, with an
intent to monitor big shipping traffic moving across the Indian Ocean
and also towards the Horn of Africa and to the Persian Gulf.
In
both these places, India will build infrastructure and operate bases
with adequate safeguards to the sovereignty of the country concerned.
The
other big proposal in this folder, which is under consideration at the
highest levels, is a possible base in Oman. That would expand Indian
presence to the mouth of the Persian Gulf. However, the entire project
would entail a massive expenditure that the government is now going
through with a toothcomb.
The next category is access India will get by way of agreements with other countries.
The
LEMOA with the US provides India access to Diego Garcia, the biggest
American base in the Indian Ocean, besides Guam, on the edge of the
Pacific Ocean.
In the same way, the logistics agreement with
France will allow India access to the strategically important French
base in the Reunion Islands near Madagascar. This is typically the
French area of colonial influence, where another opening will be the
French facilities in Djibouti in the Horn of Africa. China’s People’s
Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) already operates a military base here, its
first such base overseas.
Another agreement India signed as part
of this maritime strategy was with Singapore two months ago at the
Defence Ministers’ Dialogue. Through this understanding, India can dock
its naval platforms in Singapore for longer periods, use its facilities,
and even conduct maritime surveillance missions in the South China Sea.
Put
together, all of this completes a bigger jigsaw, much of which is now
falling into place. As a result, Indian ships and naval assets can move
across from the edge of the Pacific, Singapore down to the Andamans,
Diego Garcia, then on to Mauritius, Seychelles, and Djibouti, onwards to
Oman.
This forms the entire arc from the Pacific to the mouth of
the Persian Gulf, essentially forming the expanse now termed as the
‘Indo-Pacific’. Australia, too, is said to be interested in pursuing a
logistics agreement of the kind the US has and now France will have with
India.
So, what emerges is a group of interoperable navies
collaborating to use one another’s bases in order to build a more
effective security architecture in the Indo-Pacific.
India will
obviously service and station troops in bases that it will build and
operate. The idea should be to increase the number of foreign bases in
this category. And here is where, the government will have to find the
finances and political muscle to see it through.
China’s lead ::
There
should be no doubt that India has to make up for lost time and
opportunity on this front. While this strategy may look impressive, the
fact is China has moved far ahead, threatening to negate Indian
influence in its traditional areas of dominance.
Maldives is a
good example of how China has moved literally into India’s backyard to
build a whole port city with a possible base. This, along with its port
in Gwadar, Pakistan, provides a perfect entry into the Arabian Sea and
down to the Indian Ocean.
The Hambantota port in Sri Lanka is,
for all practical purposes, now leased to China. This has forced India
to go deeper south in the Indian Ocean towards Mauritius.
But
India must not stop there or become dependent on the US or France. It
must explore possibilities in Madagascar, which is like a junction point
in the Indian Ocean where routes diverge.
Also of big value are
the large under-sea data cables in the area, which are constantly being
probed by Chinese submarines. China is now able to mount more under-sea
missions in the Indian Ocean due to better port access, another cause of
big concern.
While Seychelles and Mauritius are good starts,
what India must ensure is more such agreements and better delivery on
the ground. The much delayed Chabahar project in Iran, which was meant
to be India’s answer to Gwadar, should serve as a constant reminder on
how poor execution can neutralise any strategic advantage or play.
theprint