On November 4, 2018, Indian prime minister Narendra Modi announced that
the Arihant, the Indian Navy’s first domestically-built nuclear-powered
submarine, completed her first deterrence patrol. The Arihant, which
means “Slayer of Enemies” in Sanskrit, uses a uranium-fueled pressurized
light-water reactor to generate 83-megawatts of electricity, allowing
the submarine to swim underwater for months at a time at speeds as high
as twenty-four knots.
Even more important than the Arihant’s
propulsion system, however, are the weapons presumably stowed in her
four vertical launch tubes: up to a dozen K-15 Sagarika (“Oceanic”)
nuclear-tipped missiles designed to launch from underwater to annihilate
an adversary’s cities and military bases. (Note that the warheads are
usually stowed separately from the missiles per Indian doctrine.)
The
Arihant is the lead-ship of India’s most expensive defense program
ever, valued at $13 billion, with its origins in the secretive Advanced
Tactical Vessel program in the 1990s. Indian engineers received
substantial Russian assistance designing the Arihant, basing her in part
on the Russian Akula-class attack submarine, one of the quietest types
operated by the Russian Navy. The Indian Navy’s only other operational
nuclear-submarine is the Akula-class Chakra II under lease from Russia
through 2022.
However, instead of developing an attack sub for
hunting enemy warships and submarines, India’s Defense Research and
Development Organization (DRDO) wanted a nuclear-powered ballistic
missile submarine (SSBN or “boomer”) to complement India’s land- and
air-based nuclear forces . Because nuclear-powered submarines can remain
submerged for months at a time and deliver their weapons from
underwater, they are considered the asset most likely to survive a
nuclear “first strike” by an adversary, guaranteeing an apocalyptic
second strike in retaliation.
The Arihant was launched in 2009
but underwent seven years of testing and sea trials before finally being
discreetly commissioned in August 2016. However, just four months
later, a hatch left open in port caused the 6,500-ton submarine to flood
with corrosive saltwater. Because of the bizarre mistake, the Indian
Navy was forced to delay deployment for 10 months to replace the
submarine’s pipes.
Even with completion of Arihant’s first
patrol, however, India’s sea-based nuclear deterrence will require years
more of work before it becomes fully credible.
To start with,
the Arihant’s ten-meter long K-15 missiles have a range of only around
430 miles, meaning that they cannot strike inland Pakistani targets,
including the capital Islamabad. Nor could K-15s hit Chinese cities when
launched from the Indian Ocean.
The DRDO has developed a
twelve-meter tall K-4 Shaurya SLBM with a range of 2,100 miles that is
due to enter service in the early 2020s. Though the Arihant successfully
test-fired a K-4 in 2016 , technical problems reportedly scrubbed a
later test in 2017.
Once the K-4 enters service, the Arihant will
finally be able to serve as deterrence against both Pakistan and China.
However, the Arihant, which remains in many respects a testbed, can
only carry four K-4s—a fraction of the payload carried by most SSBNs
around the world.
The Indian Navy will also need more than one
SSBN so that at least a few can rotate on patrols, while others undergo
repairs or are used for training. Redundancy is also necessary so that
the loss of a single boat—whether to enemy action, accidents at sea, or
absent-minded maintenance—doesn’t cripple India’s sea-based deterrence.
Towards
this end, India has already launched a second Arihant-class submarine,
the Arighat, which is expected to be commissioned between 2019-2021. The
Arighat has a more powerful reactor and can carry twice the payload:
twenty-four K-15 missiles or eight K-4s.
Additionally, the
Indian Navy has already begun construction of two to four more
Arihant-class boats of progressively larger configurations—dubbed the S4
and S4*—and carry 3,000-mile-range K-5 missiles. By the mid-2020s, the
DRDO then plans to begin construction of four larger and more advanced
S5 ballistic missile submarines which displace 15,000 tons and are armed
with twelve-sixteen launch tubes that can fire K-6 ballistic missiles.
These will have a range of 3,700 miles and separate into multiple
independent nuclear warheads (MIRVs) when reentering the atmosphere.
The
DRDO also intends to apply experience developing the Arihant towards
building six Chakra-III nuclear-powered attack submarines. Reportedly,
New Delhi’s decision to pursue the 60,000 crore ($8.4 billion) program
was prompted by the 2013 patrol of a Chinese Shang-class nuclear
submarine in the Indian Ocean. With a speed of thirty knots and
indefinite underwater endurance, the Shang-class could potentially hunt
down the slower Arihant-class, which has torpedoes for self-defense but
is not optimized for such a fight.
However, devising more
powerful nuclear reactors remains a stumbling block impeding development
of both the S5 SSBN and Chakra III. The former reportedly may require a
190-MW reactor.
By 2022, the Indian Navy will complete a nuclear
submarine base called INS Varsha, located on the central-eastern coast
of India, southwest of the shipyard at Visakhapatnam. Theoretically,
India’s boomers will depart from there on long, quiet patrols within the
“bastion” of the eastern Indian Ocean, with friendly air and naval
forces close at hand to ward away hostile sub-hunters. The submerged
subs would only launch their doomsday weapons upon receiving orders
transmitted via extremely-high-frequency radio from a national command
authority.
Despite the many milestones ahead for India to bring
its SSBN force to maturity, the Indian Navy may possess the missiles and
boats to maintain credible submarine nuclear-deterrence by the
mid-2020s.
Does this make the world a more dangerous place?
India, China and Pakistan between them have a population of 2.92 billion
people—nearly 39 percent of all human beings on the planet. A nuclear
conflict could easily claim tens, or hundreds of millions of lives.
Fortunately,
despite long-running tensions over their Himalayan borders, New Delhi
and Beijing both maintain a No-First-Use policy. This means their
militaries are authorized only employ their nuclear arsenals in
retaliation for an adversary’s nuclear strike. If both states stick to
that policy, neither will deploy nuclear weapons against the other.
Of
course, adherence to principle is hardly guaranteed in an anarchic
international system, particularly if a country believes it is facing an
existential threat. Nonetheless, the No-First-Use doctrine profoundly
impacts how India and China’s nuclear forces are equipped, trained and
organized—as well as how their respective governments signal to each
other internationally.
Pakistan, which is allied with China, is a
destabilizing factor: it has dispersed dozens of lower-yield tactical
nuclear weapons to its forward military units, and claims it is willing
to employ them in response to a non-nuclear attack. Unfortunately,
simulations suggested that tactical nuclear attacks on battlefield
targets are likely to initiate a tit-for-tat exchanges escalating to
horrifying strategic attacks targeting enemy populations. Pakistan is
also developing a submarine-based nuclear deterrent using simpler diesel
electric submarine that can launch nuclear-tipped Babar cruise missiles
.
As China is also developing a nuclear-capable stealth bomber ,
the world’s two most populous nations will soon likely boast full
nuclear deterrence triads on air, sea, and land. Hopefully, the
destructiveness of those capabilities will serve to make resorting to
nuclear arms an even more unattractive option for resolving disputes,
because the outcome of a regional nuclear exchange is horrifying to
contemplate.
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