- The Indian Navy has been looking to replace its ageing Sea King helicopters for many years
- We
are no closer to inducting the Multi-Role Helicopters (MRH), so vital
to our Navy, and that’s not going to change for a long time
- MRH helicopters are the crucial eyes, ears and long arms of the fleet
- The most striking feature of our process, which leaves us with no MRH, is that nobody is answerable and accountable for the mess
- All stakeholders – the Defence Ministry, Defence PSUs, and the private sector – need to implement vital changes
The Sea King Mk 42B has served the Indian Navy with distinction since
the 80s. But the long years in service without any upgrades have
rendered its avionics and sensors obsolescent.
A case was moved
in the new millennium for a suitable replacement for the Sea King Mk
42/42A helicopters, and came to be known as the case for 16 Multi-Role
Helicopters (16 MRH).
Meanwhile, the Indian Navy has taken vast
strides in modernisation and indigenisation. Warships from Projects 15,
15A, 17, 17A, 28, Fleet Tanker, etc, have been rolled out consistently
year on year.
The Indian Navy has been looking for a replacement
for its ageing Sea King helicopters for many years now. The Sea King Mk
42B has for long been the mainstay of our airborne anti-submarine
warfare (ASW) operations. The older Sea King Mk 42 and 42A were retired
from active service almost two decades ago.
Integral Helicopters for Indigenous Warships
Then
there are bigger decks like aircraft carrier Vikramaditya, Indigenous
Aircraft Carriers (IAC) and Landing Platform Docks (LPD) which would
also have their own helicopter squadrons. In 2008, the total helicopter
requirement of all these ships was aggregated by the navy in a massive
case for over 120 MRH. The other services had their numbers, too.
For
economies of scale, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) directed that
long-term helicopter requirements of all three services be examined as a
tri-service project named ‘Indian Multi Role Helicopter’ (IMRH).
Quite
predictably, the MoD quietly let slip the IMRH project into the hands
of public sector aerospace giant Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL),
and they started their parleys with potential partners to pursue the
project through a co-development, co-production route.
With
diverse requirements of all three services threatening to stall their
plans and the lessons learnt from the advanced light helicopter (ALH)
project still fresh, the Navy steered a separate project titled Naval
MRH (NMRH).
One Step Forward, Two Steps Back
Fleet
replacement programmes come with their own pitfalls and have large lead
times. Each service therefore soft-pedalled the IMRH case and evolved
alternate strategies to ensure survival of the ongoing, smaller
helicopter programmes.
To an extent, the IAF and army were
successful in their efforts and inked contracts for medium-lift
helicopters, attack helicopters, ALH etc, while partaking in IMRH
discussions noncommittally.
As of date, Indian warships bristle
with the latest radars, sensors and weapons. MiG 29K fighters thunder
off the carrier Vikramaditya’s decks, naval fighter pilots train on Hawk
AJTs, a naval satellite is up in space, while our indigenous nuclear
submarine is out at sea.
But we are no closer to inducting the MRH so vital to our navy. And it’s not going to change for a long time as I see it.
Taking
into account recent developments, my estimate is that it may take
another 15-20 years before the NMRH flies off our decks. It could even
take longer if we do not redraw our priorities and evolve new
strategies.
Recent news reports indicate that the navy’s
much-vaunted tender for 16 MRH has been scrapped. After almost a decade
of confabulation, bids, technical evaluations and field evaluation
trials that eventually saw the Sikorsky S70B Seahawk emerge as the sole
contender, we are back to square one.
‘Operation Successful, But Patient Dead’
A
“partial ban” was imposed by the Defence Acquisition Council in 2014 on
Finmeccanica – the parent company of AgustaWestland – which was
embroiled in a high-profile helicopter kickback controversy with the
Indian MoD.
That eliminated the other contender NH-90 NFH
(developed by a European consortium NH Industries and fielded by
AgustaWestland for the 16 MRH programme). In August 2015, the then
Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar tabled a written reply in Parliament
that the price escalation was not found acceptable by the 16 MRH
contract negotiation committee.
As per news reports, contract
negotiations have now been terminated with the only remaining contender,
as the commercial bid was way above our benchmarked price and neither
side was willing to relent.
This is yet another case of
‘operation successful, but patient dead’. It takes two to tango and even
the companies who were in the fray would not escape culpability for the
deal falling through.
A Critical Void ::
In any
operation at sea today, modern multi-role helicopters are the crucial
eyes, ears and long arms of the fleet. The only platform that can strike
fear in a submarine captain’s mind is the fleet’s integral air element
of anti-submarine helicopters.
For India, with neighbours who are
consolidating their fleets with potent submarines, lack of capable MRH
in adequate numbers is a critical capability gap that is ever-widening
even as we continue to roll out indigenous warships. When the balloon
goes up, without helicopters, these ships will be playing a blind man’s
buff in waters where a submarine holds the advantage.
To put
things in perspective, we inducted the Sea Kings in 1987 – roughly 20
years after the Royal Navy did (1969). The contract for Merlin – RN’s
Sea King replacement – was awarded in October 1991 and entered service
in 1999. Twenty years later, our Sea King replacement programme is still
on paper.
In 2006, the Merlin Capability Sustainment Programme
(MSCP) began to create 30 upgraded Merlin Mk 2s to keep the RN
helicopter fleet up to date. Having inherited our bureaucracy from the
British, one would think we should have fared better than them.
Naval Helicopter Cases in Disarray ::
Diligent
staff at naval headquarters have been drafting plans that have
repeatedly come a cropper in the byzantine corridors of MoD (Navy) where
there is full authority and zero accountability. The state of our key
helicopter programmes are languishing at various levels:
The
advanced light helicopter (Dhruv) failed to meet navy’s expectations due
to ship integration issues and challenging tri-service specifications
riding on a 5.5-ton class helicopter.
The much-awaited case for
replacing ageing Chetaks (Alouette IIIB, 1960s vintage) with naval
utility helicopters (NUH) that started in 2008 has returned to
pre-Request For Proposal (RFP) stage.
A mid-life upgrade (MLU)
case for the Sea King Mk 42B ASW helicopters which progressed till field
evaluation trials (FET) was shelved after the navy and OEM
AgustaWestland fell out on proprietary issues.
The I/NMRH
programme runs the risk of getting stuck in a bureaucratic quagmire if a
clear strategy is not evolved to navigate through all kinds of vested
interests that will be at play in this big-ticket project. Most of these
helicopters are required by the navy as of yesterday, but the project
remains on paper as on date.
A contract for mid-life upgrade of
10 ASW Kamov-28 helicopters was finally signed in 2016 after meandering
for over a decade. This is probably the only Indian helicopter upgrade
programme that is ‘on track’ as we speak.
It is quite likely that
some of the ships that originally carried these helicopters may either
be decommissioned or have little residual service life left by the time
the helicopters return from upgrade – the cost of dithering over minor
issues.
Bureaucratic Logjam ::
There are thousands of
reasons why cases can run aground in the MoD. Bureaucrats sitting on
either side of the divide have mastered the art of sending back files
with notations rather than building consensus or working out a coherent
strategy to get the services they need.
Even a single query
raised on file can set a case back by a few months. And here we have had
more than a fair share of setbacks.
What Is The Way Forward?
Collectively,
all stakeholders must shoulder the blame for this state of affairs.
Here are a few quick suggestions to ensure history doesn’t repeat
itself:
For the Indian Navy ::
All cases start with
laying down specifications in broad terms. While writing down the naval
staff qualitative requirements (NSQR), please reflect on the
consequences they may have on the project in the long term.
What
use are perfect NSQRs which get us nowhere? Many RFPs had to be
withdrawn and some resulted in single vendor situations because of
untenable SQRs.
Second, ensure that the right people are selected
for the job. Directorates that handle such projects require staff with
expertise in multiple fields that include rich operational experience,
technical knowledge and exposure to military grade testing and
certification, among others.
They should grasp the underlying
principles of aerospace and be able to interpret and apply them to
acquisition work – a sort of expert-generalist – the new-age term. Not
everybody fits this bill.
Third, avoid frequent change of key
members involved in the project (typical of any navy where we have to
‘move places to go places’) so that continuity is not lost at critical
junctures.
Fourth, link key ship projects to multi-role
helicopter acquisitions wherever you can. Today we have the KM-31 AEW
helicopters because they came with the Krivak Class stealth frigates.
The UH3H helicopters, however old, came with the Jalashwa (ex-USNS
Trenton). The MiG 29K fighters came with INS Vikramaditya. But no MRH
came with any major ship programmes because we delinked ships and
helicopters and continued working in silos.
Lastly, the prices of
defence weaponry have always been nebulous – hence, the need for great
care and rationalisation in benchmarking – a task where we are still
evolving. Where required, employ specialists and rationalise costing
models relevant to our context. Who can deny the hidden costs of doing
business in India?
To Ministry of Defence ::
We have
renamed organisations without bringing about real change. The
‘integrated headquarters of the MoD’ is a misnomer as even lessons
learnt by other services remain closely guarded secrets.
There is
no knowledge transfer across acquisition directorates of the three
services and the MoD has done little to facilitate this. That is the
biggest weakness. Then there are others.
Please wake up and smell
the coffee. Even if you don’t listen to the navy, there are enough
think-tanks that will tell you the sheer stupidity of acquiring bigger
and bigger ships without ASW helicopters while our adversaries keep
arming themselves to the teeth with better submarines.
Second,
put better policies in place because the present one is not delivering
the results on time. Our L1 policy needs to be rethought. It has ensured
nothing but ruin for armed forces procurements.
Third,
acknowledge the fact that fleet replacement projects require ‘subject
matter experts’ and cross-functional leadership over teams that must
work to a common purpose. Some of the bureaucrats need to get off their
high horses and work alongside our uniformed officers and men towards
that common purpose.
Fourth, do not watch on smugly when the
services procrastinate. Maybe they need your help. Do not disassociate
yourself from individual services’ projects. Most projects keep lurching
from one crisis to another due to lack of policy direction from higher
levels.
Fifth, allow greater autonomy to each service. Encourage
them to work through smaller numbers. Do not blow up every case into a
balloon destined to burst. Don’t needlessly bunch together tri-service
requirements in the name of economies of scale. We are the only armed
force in the world that operates helicopters from sea level to super
high altitude. There are peculiar challenges only we face.
Sixth,
mandate the use of project management models. Treat each case as a
project with defined timelines and fix accountability. Have frequent
reviews. If timelines are not met, heads must roll, even if they belong
in the ministry.
Seventh, review policies frequently. If it
doesn’t work, crack the whip. If you cannot make it work, re-strategise.
Think of the navy as something you own.
Eighth, stop being so
risk-averse and don’t cull a case because somebody made a mistake or
received kickbacks. Don’t throw the baby out with the bathwater. We have
worked very hard to reach where we are.
Future generations may find this effort futile and not worth their time if every case is seen to be floundering.
Lastly,
beware the tendency to govern by dropping jargon and catchphrases like
the DPP, IMRH, SPP, etc. It’s not working if it doesn’t deliver the
goods in time.
To Defence PSUs And Private Sector in Defence ::
First, learn to say no. Do not make open-ended promises with no understanding of what it may entail.
Second,
under the garb of indigenisation, do not throw a spanner into every
acquisition case by fielding imaginary products and capabilities that
are yet to be developed.
Till the strategic partnership model was
enunciated by Parikkar, no proposal could be finalised without defence
PSUs having their say (and their way). This does immense damage while
filling critical capability gaps.
Third, look beyond the
immediate numbers. We are at the base of the curve as far as helicopters
in India are concerned. Be willing and able to absorb some shocks in
the larger scheme of things.
Fourth, foreign companies who hire
veterans to embellish their chances of winning with the Indian MoD must
contend with the disadvantage of borrowing wisdom from a source which is
itself depleting. Don’t believe tall claims blindly. Run your numbers
and do frequent audits to see if your proposals are viable in the
long-term.
Fifth, if you lose, don’t cry foul. Refine your
strategy. Do not resort to subterfuge to scuttle cases. Indians can have
a notoriously elephantine memory.
And lastly, do not keep asking
for concessions and waivers to staff requirements. They have been
frequently revised and fine-tuned. If the NSQRs still challenge you,
improve your product.
Is Nobody Culpable?
Ultimately,
the most striking feature of our process, which leaves us with no MRH,
is that nobody is answerable and accountable for the mess that we are
in.
A navy which boasts of blue water capability and sails on
modern warships alongside the best navies in the world is left launching
the 1960s Alouette IIIB and 80s’ Sea Kings, which have far outlived
their useful lives during multilateral ‘Flyex’ serials. Most ships do
not have helicopters. Our adversary will analyse this very carefully.
The
strategic partnership model recently announced by the NDA government is
undoubtedly a positive step towards self-reliance in defence
manufacturing, should it work. But is this a solution for capability
gaps that existed as of years ago
thequint